No sirens. No explosions. No countdown clock. Just a cluster of unexplained illnesses, a hospital under strain, and officials admitting they do not know what they are dealing with. That, according to Filippa Lentzos, Reader in Science and International Security at King's College London's Department of War Studies, is how a bioweapon attack would unfold — and why the world is so poorly equipped to confront one.
Biological warfare — the deliberate use of disease-causing organisms against people, animals, or crops — is not a hypothetical threat conjured from science fiction. As The i Paper reports, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States all ran extensive, highly secretive biological warfare programmes throughout the 20th century, even as they publicly condemned such weapons. Biological arms are formally classified as weapons of mass destruction and are banned under international law by both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
Lentzos argues that the strategic calculus underpinning those prohibitions is now under serious strain. Advances in the biosciences have multiplied the number of high-containment laboratories worldwide, while techniques once confined to elite specialist groups have proliferated into universities, start-ups, and community-based research collectives. Pathogens, she notes, can now be constructed from genetic sequence data alone. Automation and machine learning are further lowering technical barriers and accelerating experimentation across borders — often with limited oversight. The ambiguity inherent to a biological attack, Lentzos writes, is not a side effect. It is the weapon's defining feature: no clear moment when peace ends and war begins.
The timing, Lentzos warns, is particularly dangerous. Military spending is rising globally, great power competition has returned with force, and institutional trust is eroding. Longstanding arms-control frameworks, including the Biological Weapons Convention itself, are under pressure. The convergence of accessible biotechnology, weakened international norms, and renewed geopolitical rivalry has created conditions in which the barriers to misusing biology are falling at exactly the wrong moment.
Lentzos stops short of claiming that states are quietly engineering apocalyptic super-viruses. But her argument carries a cold precision: the next biological threat may not announce itself, and by the time the world recognises it for what it is, the damage may already be done.


